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1Protecting the Internet with Public Work
Ed Kaiser Wu-chang Feng
Portland State University
{edkaiser,wuchang}@cs.pdx.edu
Abstract— Distributed denial-of-service attacks represent a
growing problem for networked systems. To tackle this prob-
lem, this paper explores the addition of a public work function
to the service advertisement mechanisms used by such systems.
When under attack, services advertise this function along with
their location information and clients must attach a solution to
the function with subsequent requests. The function, which can
be made specific to the source of traffic, is publicly verifiable,
allowing arbitrary network devices at the edges of the network
to quickly verify that subsequent communication from the
source will be accepted by the destination. We describe a
number of different ways public work can augment current
systems and evaluate a promising instantiation of the public
work scheme using DNS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unwanted traffic on the Internet still poses significant
challenges. One of the problems is the lack of mechanisms
for controlling who or how someone accesses public ser-
vices. Once its location is known, unsolicited traffic can
immediately reach any service. There have been a number
of approaches for combating unwanted traffic with solutions
ranging from indirection [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], filtering [6],
[7], capabilities [8], [9], [10], and proof-of-work [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18].
The above systems have salient features that must be
combined to adequately address the problem. Indirection
provides the ability to hide or dynamically relocate a public
service in order to prevent malicious clients from reaching
the service indefinitely. Filtering is necessary to stop un-
wanted traffic as close to the source as possible. Capabilities
are necessary to give services dynamic fine-grained control
at the request level over who is given access. Finally, proof-
of-work is necessary to ensure malicious clients commit as
many resources as they are requesting from a service.
In this paper, we describe a system that integrates aspects
of each of the techniques into a single mechanism based
on the notion of public work. The crux of the scheme is
simple. The service, when advertising its location, provides
a publicly verifiable work function. In order to reach the
service, a client must attach a valid answer to this function
along with its service request. If the client does not, any
network device that has seen the advertisement can verify
that subsequent requests are not wanted by the service and
can drop them. Since the service itself controls the difficulty
of the work function passed back to the clients, it can
control access at a fine granularity.
Service request with valid public work
Public work verifier
Service request with invalid or no public work
Service advertisement with public work function
Fig. 1. The public work approach.
There are two significant contributions in this paper.
First, we elaborate upon the concept of a public work
function; a work function with answers that can be verified
by machines other than issuer. Second, we describe how
a service advertisement mechanism can leverage a public
work function to protect its service from unwanted traffic.
II. BASIC APPROACH
Figure 1 shows the basic approach. When advertising
its location, a service also supplies a source-specific work
function whose solution must be computed by the client
and attached to subsequent requests before being given
service. The work function can be delivered on-demand
(e.g. piggybacked on DNS replies) or a-priori (e.g. via
key insertions in a DHT [3], periodic publishing [19], pre-
fetching [20], [21]). The work function is easy to generate
and verify, yet adjustably difficult to compute a correct
answer. The crucial property is that answers are publicly
verifiable, allowing any network device that observes the
advertisement to validate subsequent service requests. This
enables the edge of the network to detect and filter out
traffic that is unwanted by the service. As shown in the
figure, requests that lack a valid solution are filtered at the
first network device that verifies public work.
The scheme embodies ideas of proof-of-work. The work
function given to the client is a puzzle of a certain difficulty.
The client must solve the puzzle correctly and attach the
answer to subsequent requests in order to reach the service.
The public work scheme draws from indirection by
enabling a service to avoid attack by dynamically changing
its reachable locations through frequent updates to the
public work function. To send a request that will reach the
2service, a client must have both the service location and
a correct answer to the most recent public work function.
Furthermore, the function is source-specific so the service
can control the reachable locations on a per-client basis.
The scheme draws on aspects of filtering by supporting
destination-controlled filtering at the edges of the network.
Specifically, filters can be placed at any point in the network
that observes both the advertisement and the subsequent
requests. For example, the first-hop router at the client could
easily store public work advertisements and check that
subsequent requests are valid. A service receiving unwanted
traffic would advertise to the sources public work functions
with high degree of difficulty or ones without solutions.
If a source solves its function, it is slowed considerably.
If it ignores the function, intermediate filters will drop its
packets.
The scheme draws on capabilities by giving the service
complete control over the clients that access it by binding
the work function to the requesting client. As before, it can
advertise difficult public work functions to clients that it
does not wish to hear from and simple ones to clients it does
wish to service. Public verification allows the edge of the
network to determine if request contains a valid capability.
There are a number of ways that public work could
protect Internet services. One could attach public work
functions to triggers and keys in I3 and DHTs [2], [3], [22],
[23], to beacons in SOS and Mayday [1], [4], to content
advertisements in Freenet [24], and to DNS lookups [25].
In this paper, we demonstrate a DNS-based instantiation.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS
A. Public Work Function
A work function, also known as a cryptographic puzzle,
has the signature W : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ which relates a
puzzle PD (where D is the puzzle difficulty) to an answer
A. To be effective, any machine solving for A given PD
must perform Ω(D) units of work. In contrast, verifying
that A is a solution to PD must take O(1) units of work.
When any entity can verify that a puzzle-answer pair is
valid or not, the work function is considered public. It is
possible that many public work functions might exist. We
believe the following four properties are necessary for a
public work function used within the network:
• Fast issuing: Generating the public work function must
add minimal cost to service advertisement.
• Fast verification: While finding a solution to the public
work function must be difficult, verifying a solution
must add minimal cost to request forwarding.
• Flexible binding: The public work function must be
flexible enough to bind to various scales of communi-
cation, such as packets, flows, or flow aggregates.
• Limited precomputation and replay: The public work
function must prevent precomputation and replay
attacks.
To meet the above requirements, our suggested public
work function is based on the notion of targeted function
reversal. In particular,
G(A,F,NC , T ) ≡ 0 mod D
where F represents flow properties of the subsequent re-
quest such as the addresses of the source and destination,
T represents the time range on which answers will be ac-
cepted, and NC represents a client specific random number
generated by the issuer. The core function G is any one-
way function that has uniformly distributed random output.
The function must be one-way so that finding the unknown
parameter A involves a non-trivial search. Intuitively, it
must also have uniformly random output so that the solver
is expected to try D distinct values for A before finding
a value that satisfies the equation. In cryptographic terms,
G is assumed to be a random oracle. This work function
addresses the requirements above in the following manner:
• Fast issuing: The issuer only needs to generate the
random number NC and a difficulty D to issue a new
work function to a particular client.
• Fast verification: A verifier that has recorded NC
and the service advertisement, only needs to compute
G and the modulus to determine the validity of the
subsequent communication. Computing the modulus is
inexpensive with respect to computing G.
• Flexible binding: The parameters that define F are
configurable and include the source and destination
addresses, ports, and other protocol fields.
• Limited precomputation and replay: The validity of
any particular public work function is directly con-
trolled by the service. Precomputation and replay are
limited since the work function is periodically updated
through generating and advertising a new random
number NC , as well as the time range T . The time
range is included so that the service can expire puzzles
more frequently than NC is updated.
B. Core Function Selection
We investigate the suitability of various cryptographic
primitives (block ciphers and hash functions) to be used
as the core function in the puzzle. Speed is the primary
requirement since puzzle issuers will be faced with a large
number of clients. Number theoretic primitives are not
considered because they are prohibitively expensive.
Block Cipher vs. Hash Function Puzzle Constructions:
In deployment, difficulties will range from 0 to 264 units
of work, so D must be an 8-byte integer. To ensure the
existence of an answer, A must be at least as large as D. To
prevent table-lookup attacks, the random number NC must
also be sufficiently large. The time range T is composed of
two 4-byte integers. Finally, the flow identifier F is 12-bytes
for the address and port of both the source and destination.
In total the input must incorporate 36 bytes.
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Fig. 2. Puzzle construction using a block cipher. A hatch mark indicates
the input that is the key to the cipher.
answer (A)
flow (F)
time range (T)
random number (NC)
0 mod Dh
Fig. 3. Puzzle construction using a hash function.
In constructing a block cipher based puzzle, recall that
block ciphers have two opposite operations: enciphering and
deciphering. If the key were fixed, a one-way construction is
not possible since a plaintext can trivially be found that pro-
duces the desired ciphertext and vice versa. Consequently,
a block cipher based puzzle must use the block cipher’s
resistance to key-reversal. Such a design produces uniform
random output under the common assumption that the block
cipher E is a secure pseudo-random function.
No block cipher has a large enough key to contain all the
puzzle parameters. As a result, the construction sequentially
chains cipher calls together. Of the ciphers investigated, the
largest key size is 16 bytes, so at least three cipher calls are
required to consume the puzzle parameters. The resulting
construction is shown in Figure 2. For ciphers with smaller
key sizes, more cipher calls are required.
To solve the puzzle, a client selects a candidate answer
A, and uses it as a key to encipher the random number NC .
That result is enciphered using the flow identifier F as the
key. That result is then enciphered using the time range T
as the key. The result is cast as an integer and taken modulo
the difficulty D. If the remainder is zero, A is a solution,
otherwise the client must restart and try a new value for A.
In contrast to the block cipher based construction, the
hash based construction requires the solver to back-out
the message that produces a given digest. In particular,
this construction exploits the hash function’s preimage-
resistance [26]. The input to each hash function is large
enough to consume the concatenation of all the parameters.
Each construction uses a single execution of the hash
internal compression function, as shown in Figure 3.
Selecting the Construction: Public implementations of
the primitives were measured on both Linux (using g++
v. 3.4.2) and Windows (using Visual C++ .NET) 1.8GHz
Intel machines. The compiled code was optimized for speed
rather than size. The Intel rdtsc benchmarking instruction
was used to accurately measure the clock cycles to execute
each primitive. We indicate on which operating system the
fastest measurement for each primitive was obtained.
Table I shows the clock cycles to cipher, decipher, and
key various block ciphers. The table is sorted by the
Block Key Block Keying En/Decipher OS
Cipher Size Size Effort Effort
(bytes) (bytes) (cycles) (cycles)
TEA 16 8 – 620/584 Linux
Rijndael 16 16 208/312 408/472 WinXP
XTEA 16 8 – 660/652 Linux
IDEA 8 8 308/2628 472/472 Linux
Twofish 16 16 1304 852/768 Linux
DES 8 8 2400 592/592 WinXP
RC6 16 16 2024 1088/1080 Linux
Serpent 16 16 3420 3872/2780 Linux
3-DES 16 8 3864 3236/3264 Linux
Safer 8 8 5184 3116/2228 Linux
CAST 16 16 8904 1708/1712 Linux
LOKI 16 16 11444 2904/2916 Linux
DEAL 16 16 15268 4152/4180 WinXP
TABLE I
BLOCK CIPHER SPEEDS.
Hash IV Input Hash OS
Compression Size Size Effort
Function (bytes) (bytes) (cycles)
MD5 16 64 600 Linux
SHA-1 20 64 1144 WinXP
RIPEMD-128 16 64 1144 Linux
RIPEMD-256 32 64 1380 Linux
RIPEMD-320 40 64 2324 Linux
TIGER 24 64 2496 Linux
TABLE II
HASH COMPRESSION FUNCTION SPEEDS.
cycles incurred to key and run each cipher once, since
this corresponds to its use in the construction. For some
ciphers, key setup is asymmetric so we report keying for
enciphering followed by keying for deciphering. The table
shows three suitable ciphers: Tiny Encryption Algorithm
(TEA), its strengthened variant XTEA, and Rijndael. Their
puzzle constructions must key and call the cipher three
times, taking approximately 1800 cycles to compute.
Table II shows the clock cycles required to execute the
various hash compression functions. The table is sorted by
speed and shows MD5 as the leader by a clear margin. The
construction invokes the hash compression function once,
so the cost of computing the hash based construction is
approximately the cost of running the compression function
once, which in the case of MD5 is 600 cycles.
Even the slightly slower SHA-1 and RIPEMD-128 con-
structions are faster than the best block cipher constructions.
For speed, we choose a hash based construction over a
cipher based construction. However, with a number of
public attacks on cryptographic hash functions [27], [28],
[29], the reliance of the public work scheme on a hash-
based primitive is of concern. This is addressed in several
ways.
First, the puzzle design is independent of the hash func-
tion used by any particular implementation. As a result, if
the hash function selected for the implementation is found
to be completely broken (that is, the digest reveals enough
information about the message that it is faster to reverse the
hash function than solve the puzzle), another hash function
can be easily substituted.
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Fig. 4. Average workload for SHA-1 puzzles at various difficulties.
Second, the published attacks target a different property
of cryptographic hash functions; the attacks attempt to find
two distinct input strings that hash to the same digest
(known as a hash-collision). The attacks are only concerned
with the digest being the same for both messages. Since the
attack is not concerned with finding a message that produces
a specific digest (i.e. preimage resistance), the attack has no
applicability to the puzzle construction.
Finally, the best attacks still require a large number of
hash operations [30]. Of particular note, the best attacks on
the collision resistance of MD5 require on the order of 239
MD5 operations, while the best attacks on SHA-1 require
on the order of 263 SHA-1 operations. This difference in the
collision resistance, if in any way indicative of the hashes’
preimage resistance, has led us to choose SHA-1 over MD5.
Uniformly Distributed Output: Although hash functions
have not been proven to have uniformly distributed output,
experimental evidence indicates that many indeed produce
uniformly distributed output [31]. To test our puzzle con-
struction using SHA-1, we randomly generated 10,000
puzzles at each difficulty and then solved them, keeping
track of the number of hashes required to find a solution.
The average number of hashes to solve a puzzle is linear in
the difficulty as shown in Figure 4. This indicates that SHA-
1 has uniformly random output and that the construction
allows for fine-grained control over the puzzle workload.
IV. DNS-BASED INSTANTIATION
To showcase a system that uses public work to protect
Internet services against unwanted traffic, we designed and
built an instantiation using modifications to the current DNS
lookup and advertisement mechanisms.
A. Assumptions
It is important to understand some underlying assump-
tions that drive aspects of our instantiation. In particular,
our approach assumes the following:
• Source spoofing: We assume that spoofing source
addresses is still possible [7], [32], but that flood-
ing attacks using spoofed source addresses are rare.
Specifically, the proliferation of ingress filtering [33],
[34], [35] has reduced opportunities for spoofing. In
addition, since compromised machines have significant
economic value to their owners [36], [37], [38], they
typically do not attempt activity that would attract
attention such as sourcing a packet flood with spoofed
addresses.
• Blind spoofing of DNS advertisements difficult: We
assume that it is difficult for a machine other than
the authoritative name server to produce a valid DNS
reply. That is, the underlying advertisement mechanism
is secure and that appropriate measures have been
taken to eliminate DNS cache poisoning and blind
spoofing attacks [39], [40].
• Path between client and server is not completely asym-
metric: We assume that there exists an enforcement
point at the client edge (such as the first-hop router,
a DSL/cable modem or an access link) that is on
the path both to and from the client and server. This
is to ensure that the verifier has the ability to store
public work advertisements and to validate subsequent
replies. Note that, asymmetry such as multihoming can
be accommodated if secure sharing of collected public
work advertisements is supported.
B. DNS Lookup
Figure 5 shows the general approach which modifies
the DNS lookup mechanism commonly used. Typical DNS
lookups start with a client issuing a recursive query to their
local DNS cache for the name being resolved. If the cache
does not already have the record, it iteratively queries the
DNS hierarchy until it reaches the authoritative name server
which returns the result.
In our instantiation, rather than issue a recursive query
to the local DNS cache for the name, the client issues a
recursive query for the authoritative server of the name
(i.e. the NS record). Upon receiving the location of the
authoritative server, it then issues an iterative query to the
authoritative server to get the location and the public work
function associated with it. This allows the issuer to send
the client-specific public work function directly to the client,
preventing malicious agents that are not along the path from
obtaining the work function for a client and then spoofing
requests from that client. Since the reply containing the
public work function is sent directly from the issuer to the
client, any network device along this path can note the work
function and verify subsequent requests satisfy the function.
As this requires both path symmetry and per-flow state to
be kept to work, this should be done as close to the client
as possible such as at the first-hop router.
The approach retains a significant amount of the caching
benefit within the DNS hierarchy, namely all of the inter-
55. Edge device stores reply
and public work function
8. Edge device verifies
public work function 
before forwarding
service request
7. Edge device verifies
public work function 
before forwarding
service request
==SHA−1(A, F, Nc, T)    0 mod Dc
F  = flow identifier of service request
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A  = integer answer
Dc = per−client integer difficulty
Nc = per−client random integer
T = time range
3. Iterative DNS request to
NS of ieee.org for ieee.org
1. Recursive DNS request
for NS of ieee.org 2. DNS reply with IP addr
of NS of ieee.org
Internet
4. Edge device generates DNS
6. Client calculates A such that
to service request
and public work function (Dc, Nc, T)
and attaches A, Dc, Nc, and T
reply with IP addr of ieee.org
ieee.org
Fig. 5. A DNS-based instantiation of public work.
mediate lookups, however, the final resolved name cannot
be cached [41]. While this can lead to more load on the
authoritative servers, there are several mitigating factors.
The first is that the DNS lookup operation on the author-
itative server has very low overhead and is easily scaled.
The name database itself can be placed entirely in memory
and the process is easily parallelizable [42]. The second
is the increasing use of CDNs to distribute names has
reduced the latency difference between serving a name
out of the local DNS server cache and serving a name
from the authoritative server [43]. In addition, many of
the low-level DNS entries themselves have short TTLs to
support responsive failover for production web services. As
shown in several DNS studies [44], [45], [46], a policy of
reducing the TTL of advertisements drives down DNS cache
hit rates substantially. Even with such mitigating factors,
a measurement study will be required to understand the
scheme’s impact on DNS caching performance given the
penchant for local DNS servers to ignore DNS TTLs [47].
C. Work Management
From an economic standpoint, in order for a proof-of-
work scheme to be effective, the amount of work done by
the “good guys” and the amount of work achievable by
the “bad guys” must differ significantly [48]. In particular,
due to the sheer number of compromised systems that
exist today, a global difficulty setting is easily overcome
by brute force. Stated slightly differently, no proof-of-work
system can function properly unless difficulties are properly
tailored based on the usage history of client.
There are ways to tailor work function difficulty to
clients by using information from reputation systems, black
lists, packet queue heuristics, and resource consumption
records. Unfortunately, such an intricate control mechanism
is outside the scope of this paper. In our implementation,
client difficulties are proportional to the requests they send
to the service.
D. Attack Vectors
It is helpful to analyze the protection provided by the
DNS instantiation of public work by looking at a number
of attack vectors that a set of malicious machines might
employ against it.
Request flooding with valid public work: With the sheer
amount of resources available in large Botnets, the attacker
could attempt to solve the public work given to each of
the zombie clients. Given a proper strategy for setting
the difficulty based on usage, the public work functions
assigned to the zombies will become harder, eventually
to a point where zombie clients cannot flood packets fast
enough to overwhelm the service. In addition, the work
function essentially pinpoints the zombies sourcing the
traffic, drawing attention to the compromised machines.
Request flooding without valid public work: The attacker
could ignore all public work advertisements it receives and
attempt to send service requests without performing work.
In this case, any verifier at the client edge that has recorded
the public work function, can efficiently determine that the
request traffic would eventually be filtered at the destination
and drop it early. At worst, if no device near the client
enforces public work, a device at the server’s edge will
perform the verification and drop the requests at the entry
point to its network.
Flooding issuer with DNS requests: The attacker can
attempt to disable the service by disabling the issuer via
flooding it with DNS requests. This is difficult due to the
efficiency of the lookup mechanism itself. In particular,
the the lookup is easily parallelizable, the replies consume
a modest amount of bandwidth, and the name database
can easily be stored in memory [42]. Flooding attacks
using spoofed DNS requests will then force the attacker
to generate large amounts of spoofed traffic which are
counter to our first assumption. If such attacks are possible,
however, one could mitigate its effect by applying public
work to the DNS lookups going to the authoritative name
6server by attaching a work function to the NS record.
Spoofing the issuer: The attacker can attempt to forge
the service advertisement and the public work function
itself via a DNS poisoning attack [39]. In this case, our
system relies on the security of the current DNS lookup to
ensure this is difficult. Proper filtering of replies and the
use of DNSsec [40] eliminate this avenue of attack. In fact,
much larger problems exist if the adversary lies along the
path between clients and the service, or if traffic can be
redirected away from the legitimate service.
Spoofing work: The attacker can target a single client
by using the zombie network to perform large amounts
of public work using the victim’s public work function.
The attacker can then spoof subsequent requests in order
to inflate the resource consumption and difficulty for the
victim. This attack is rendered useless since the public work
advertisement is sent directly from the issuer to the client.
The attacker would have to lie somewhere along the path
between the client and server to to capture the client-specific
public work function.
Spoofing DNS requests: The attacker can target a single
client by repeatedly spoofing DNS requests from it to the
authoritative name server. While the victim will receive the
valid service advertisement and public work function, it will
be forced to drop it since it did not request the information
and can not tell if it is valid. This attack vector can be
used for multiple purposes. The attacker could disable all
services for the victim by spoofing DNS requests to all
of the services the victim wishes to contact in advance or
the attacker could disable a particular service by spoofing
DNS requests from all clients going to that service. Both
require large amounts of spoofed traffic to be sent which is
counter to our assumptions. While there are several ways
to mitigate this attack, perhaps the cleanest is to rely on
DNSsec. Rather than drop the service advertisement and
public work function generated by a spoofed DNS request,
the victim can verify that the advertisement is valid and
keep it for future use. Other mechanisms that mitigate this
problem include adding public work to the lookup at the
authoritative name server or rate limiting DNS requests
(especially duplicate ones) per host at the network ingress.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation involved changes to the open-source
name server BIND [49]. In total, only 39 lines of code
were modified to issue a new record type. The public
work verifier was implemented as an iptables module
that hooks into the Linux network chains. Answers are
packed into the sequence and acknowledgement numbers
of the SYN packet. To facilitate this, a client puzzle solver
was also implemented as a network module. Both modules
were implemented in under 200 lines of code. [Note to
reviewers: All code associated with the implementation will
be made publicly available]. The implementation details are
described below:
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                    address                    |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                                               |
+                  difficulty                   +
|                                               |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                                               |
+                random number                  +
|                                               |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                validation time                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
|                expiration time                |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
Fig. 6. Format of the DNS puzzle record. The width is 32 bits.
A. Authoritative DNS Server
To support a public work function in the BIND name
server named, a new puzzle (PUZ) record type was added.
This record returns the service address similar to an A
record but also includes the client-specific parameters of
the work function: the difficulty DC , the random number
NC , and the time range T (expressed as a start time and
expiration time). The structure of the RDATA portion of the
record is shown in Figure 6.
This record type involved modification of the BIND
database loading routine which is only executed at start
up to mark service names that it require a work function
to be advertised with the location. The database searching
routine was modified to return a stub puzzle record (only
containing the address) when it finds a PUZ entry for the
service. The response generating routine was modified to
append the parameters DC , NC and T to the stub puzzle
record. This routine is where DC and NC are looked up.
No further modifications are necessary when the structure is
passed to the functions for formatting, appending authority
information, and finally sending the datagram.
B. Verifying Router
This iptables module is designed to be placed at
either edge of the network and observe PUZ records as
they pass by. Later, it verifies the subsequent SYN packet
of flows corresponding to the PUZ records. The router uses
a hash table with 100,000 entries to store the parameters
and IP portions of the flow identifier. Recall that the PUZ
record is sent from the DNS authority directly to the client;
so the client address is the destination address while the
service address is extracted from the PUZ record.
When the router observers the subsequent SYN packet
sent from the client to the service, it fetches the stored
DC , NC , and T . If the parameters are fresh (i.e. the
time is within T ), the router takes the answer (stored in
the sequence and acknowledgement numbers) and SHA-
1 hashes it with parameters, and checks that the digest is
congruent with zero modulo DC . If it is, the answer is
correct and the packet is forwarded. Otherwise if the answer
is wrong, the packet is dropped.
C. Client Puzzle Solver
Similar to the verifying module, the client puzzle solver
observes PUZ records sent to clients in its network, record-
ing the parameters DC , NC , and T of the work function
7Sub-Process Unmodified BIND Modified BIND
(cycles) (cycles)
Receive Request 8130± 2368 9254± 2503
Parse Request 1500± 808 1684± 850
Search Database 13702± 3459 13720± 3654
Create Reply 4976± 1662 4561± 1717
Add Auth Info 31627± 5510 32906± 5632
Send Reply 110079± 9450 109058± 9411
Total 170013± 17498 171183± 16512
TABLE III
TIMING ANALYSIS OF DNS REQUEST PROCESSING.
with the appropriate flow. These parameters are stored in a
hash table similar to the one used in the verifying router.
When the solver observes a TCP SYN packet correspond-
ing to a previously observed PUZ record, the solver begins
the search for a solution. As stated earlier, the resulting
answer is packed into the sequence and acknowledgement
numbers in the SYN packet. While this avoids adding an
IP option (which would cause some routers to process the
packet in the slow path) and appears transparent to the end
hosts, it adds complication in that the sequence numbers of
all following packets must be translated as to not disrupt
the TCP state at either end. This masquerading requires a
second table to store the precise flow (addresses and ports
of both the client and server) as well as the delta between
the new sequence numbers and the original. To minimize
the delta, the solver begins the search for the answer from
the original sequence numbers.
Finally, the client DNS resolver had to be modified to
directly query the authoritative DNS server and accept the
PUZ response. These changes were very minimal and added
10 lines of code.
D. Benchmarking the system
We measured each component of the system individually.
The measurements were taken on Linux 1.8GHz Intel
machines using g++ v. 3.4.2 and the rdtsc benchmarking
instruction. The machines have gigabit Ethernet cards.
The first component measured was the authoritative name
server. Table III summarizes the cycles required to compute
each subroutine for 1 million requests before and after
modification. As the table shows, the modified routines
are minimally impacted. Specifically, the overhead within
those routines are within the standard deviation of each
other. Further, the database and searching routines, which
contain most of the modifications, comprise a small fraction
(approximately 11%) of the total time required to process
a DNS request. Not surprisingly, the most expensive sub-
routine (one not directly altered) is the one for putting the
datagram on the wire. Even though we are sending a slightly
larger response, the time to execute this bottleneck is not
noticeably impacted.
The total time required to process a request is around
100µs on the 1.8GHz machine, meaning that a single
authoritative DNS server can process 10,000 DNS re-
Sub-Process Effort (cycles)
Record Work Function 913± 257
Verify Answer 2744± 1976
TABLE IV
TIMING ANALYSIS FOR THE NETWORK VERIFIER.
Sub-Process Effort (cycles)
Record Work Function 2055± 2012
Store Answer 2614± 2447
Translate Sequence Numbers 1013± 690
TABLE V
TIMING ANALYSIS FOR THE CLIENT SOLVER.
quests per second. Since DNS is very parallelizable, load-
balancing amongst several DNS authorities can increase
lookup throughput and thus work function issuance. Load-
balancing, if done by IP range, has the additional benefit of
reducing the range of addresses that each issuer will see,
as a result one could expect to see speed improvements in
establishing per-client difficulty.
Next we measured the verification router module. Ta-
ble IV summarizes the cycles to record puzzles and verify
TCP SYN packets. The table shows that the function for
recording puzzles is extremely fast. We believe this is due
to this module only having one table to access, resulting
in good cache performance. The function for verifying
answers is somewhat more expensive since it must compute
one hash. These times correspond to 0.5µs to record a work
function and 1.5µs to verify a SYN packet. We believe the
verification operation is fast enough (650,000 verifications
per second) for a client edge device since it has limited
hosts it is working for.
Finally we measured the client solver module. Table V
summarizes the cycles to record puzzles, translate sequence
numbers (in either direction), and the base cost of recording
a puzzle answer. We notice that the effort to record puzzles
and store answers is more than that required of the verifier.
We believe this is due to cache misses since we are
manipulating twice as much memory here. Note that the
timing of this function omits the time it takes the client
to solve the puzzle because it varies and is intended to be
large for bad clients. We are pleased to observe that the
translation function is inexpensive (just over 0.5µs) since
it is used most frequently.
VI. RELATED WORK
SOS [1], Mayday [4]: SOS and Mayday use indirection
to dynamically hide the location of the service being pro-
tected. Note that, in a sense, layered names [50], scheduled
names [51], and HIP [52] provide similar functionality, but
their use in mitigating targeted attacks has not been as
clearly defined. The public work system differs from these
schemes in its use of proof-of-work as part of the indirec-
tion. In addition, rather than relying on a centralized set of
beacons to perform the validation and filtering, the public
work scheme allows multiple intermediate nodes along the
8path to perform the functions. In its DNS instantiation, the
public work system also does not rely on an overlay net-
work. Public work functions are a complementary feature
that could be added to the overlay schemes, however. For
example, a public work function could be used as a Mayday
authenticator, which when propagated throughout the ring,
allows traffic shedding at the edges.
i3 [3]: The i3-based scheme uses the notion of public
and private triggers for accessing services. The public
trigger is used to negotiate the parameters of the private
trigger. i3 adds a proof-of-work mechanism to protect the
private trigger mechanism. With the public work scheme,
the service advertisement is equivalent to the public trigger
and the subsequent answer to the public work function
serves as a private trigger. The two key differences are
that the public work issuer can validate requests using a
constant amount of state rather than having to rely on a large
puzzle database and that verifiers can be placed anywhere
along the path that sees both the service advertisement and
the subsequent requests. A straight-forward extension to i3
would be to propagate a public work function back through
the overlay. The overlay node that is directly connected to
the source would then store the public work function in
order to validate subsequent communication.
Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) [5]:
Like NASR, the public work approach is inspired by the ap-
plication of biological diversity into computer systems [53],
[54], [55], [56]. Rather than directly modifying the actual
location of the service, however, the public work scheme
randomizes its “effective” location. In a sense, the true loca-
tion of a service can be seen as the dynamic concatenation
of an answer to a recent public work function along with
the destination address and port.
Pushback [6]: The public work scheme is similar to Push-
back in that it allows for upstream filtering all the way back
to the source of attack. Whereas Pushback supports binary
filtering, the public work scheme provides an analog filter
which can be tuned by changing the difficulty setting of
the work function. One important difference is that source-
based Pushback filters are amenable for use throughout the
network while the public work verifiers are suitable only at
the edges. In particular, at the issuer, the verifier runs with
a constant amount of state while at any other point in the
network, the verifier is required to keep per-flow state in
the form of service advertisements.
DNS blacklists [57]: DNS-bl is a cooperative effort
amongst DNS providers to deny DNS service to known
spam domains. Its power is in its ability to take distributed
reports of abuse and to aggregate them into a database that
any DNS server can use to keep spammers from correctly
resolving names. The public work scheme takes a similar
approach, but integrates proof-of-work to obtain a dynamic,
analog control over malicious sources. The public work
approach could benefit significantly by using the aggregated
reports provided by DNS-bl.
Capabilities [8], [9], [10]: Capability systems provide the
end service fine-grained control over who is given access.
In a sense, the service advertisement containing the public
work function is a capability. Public work can augment
capabilities by adding proof-of-work so that malicious
clients cannot target multiple services simultaneously and
by allowing capabilities to be publicly verified rather than
relying on the issuer for this. Providing early enforcement
of capabilities stops malicious activity closer to the source.
Proof-of-work [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18]: Public work is an instantiation of proof-of-work and
client puzzles. Unlike previous approaches, the public work
scheme works across all named services and not just for
a single protocol or application. One exception is network
layer puzzles. The public work scheme differs from network
layer puzzles in its use of public verification. In particular,
the puzzle issuer and puzzle verifier no longer have to be
co-located. Perhaps closest to the public work scheme is
Hashcash [14], a publicly verifiable proof-of-work system
that targets spam. In Hashcash, global random numbers
(the lottery numbers of the previous day) are used to
produce work that can be verified by any mail server.
Our approach differs in that it is service-based: the service
itself generates and broadcasts the public work function. In
addition, Hashcash only protects against spam.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
While our instantiation indicates that public work is a
promising approach for combating the problem of unwanted
traffic, there are many issues that still need to be addressed.
As described earlier, one area that needs to be more fully
examined is the impact that the specific DNS modifications
have on network performance. In particular, since per-client
public work functions effectively disable DNS caching
for the final name lookup, it is important to measure
the impact such a change will have on lookups to the
authoritative servers. Another area that must be addressed
is the performance of the system while it is under attack
by sophisticated adversaries. Our end goal is to develop an
algorithm for managing work functions so that the optimal
strategy for the adversary is to act like an average client.
While developing these local algorithms and policies is
important, another interesting avenue for future work is to
use federated reputation systems such as DShield or DNS-
bl to drive work functions [57]. Using such coordination
prevents an adversary from targeting multiple sites. Finally,
while targeted function reversal has many salient features,
it is only one of many possible public work functions
that could be used. We plan on examining and comparing
alternative public work functions for use in our system.
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